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Networks are known to be prone to link failures. In this paper we set out to investigate how
networks of varying connectivity patterns respond to different link failure schemes in terms of con-
nectivity, clustering coefficient and shortest path lengths. We then propose a measure, which we
call the vulnerability of a network, for evaluating the extent of the damage these failures can cause.
Accepting the disconnections of node pairs as a damage indicator, vulnerability simply represents
how quickly the failure of the critical links cause the network to undergo a specified damage extent.
Analyzing the vulnerabilities under varying damage specifications shows that scale free networks
are relatively more vulnerable for small failures, but more efficient; whereas Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks
are the least vulnerable despite lacking any clustered structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the definition of network failure varies, the
undisputed fact is that nodes or links can and will fail.
The question of how vulnerable networks are against ran-
dom failures or targeted attacks has been investigated
by numerous researchers[1–3]. Whether nodes or links
should be considered as subjects of these failures de-
pends on the context: If the network under investiga-
tion is a model of the Internet[4], a computer may break
down unexpectedly, which corresponds to a node failure.
In the case of a transportation network[5], a highway
bridge may collapse after an earthquake, in which case
one rather speaks of a link failure. When power grids
are the subject[6–9], power lines may fail as well as the
stations whence they emanate; thus links and nodes can
also fail simultaneously. Networks can also suffer from
intentional attacks as opposed to random failures. Inves-
tigating the changes in the character and/or performance
of networks in any of these failure scenarios is crucial to
understanding the extent of damage they may suffer as
well as providing insight to how they can be reinforced
and determining which network types are more vulnera-
ble.
The concept of vulnerability is associated with a sys-
tem’s ability to fulfill its specific purpose under imposed
conditions. The purpose of the network dictates the con-
ditions under which the system is no longer functioning,
thus it must be specified in order to measure vulnera-
bility. The primary purpose common for all networks
is transmission across links. Failure scenarios generally
involve a disconnection in the network, caused by a com-
bination of link failures, such that some source nodes can
no longer send signals or packages to some other target
∗ Corresponding Author, serdar.colak@boun.edu.tr
nodes. If a network is divided into several components
and its connectivity is impaired, it is no longer capable
of fully performing its transmission function.
A network may still function after the failure of certain
nodes or links. In the instance of a highway network, if
the direct route between two towns is no longer usable,
the traffic may, if possible, be directed to an alternative
path. If there is such a path between all pairs of nodes
in the network after the failure events occur, then the
network is still connected. Even if there is no such path,
the traffic in the disconnected subnetworks do not have
to come to a halt. Thus the network is still somewhat
able to fulfill its function, although maybe not as effi-
ciently and thoroughly as it used to. Therefore, only
focusing on maintaining the overall connectivity is not
always enough. Considering the case where the failures
push the network to the limit where it can barely stay
connected, the lack of alternative paths between node
pairs inhibit network performance. Controlling the con-
nectivity is important, but changes in network perfor-
mance must also be monitored.
Network performance can be measured by various pa-
rameters which are generally based on path measures
such as shortest paths, random walks, or some other
measure between these two extremes. Such performance
measures often deal with how efficiently signals and goods
can be carried along the network. In an unrealistic model
in which adding links to a network has no cost, a net-
work designer would very likely want to connect each
node to all others: In this case any transmission would
be carried out by moving along only one link, and both
the total number of alternative paths and the network
performance attain their maximum values. Hence com-
plete networks have the best performance and are least
vulnerable, despite being rare in real life. At the other
extreme, a tree network is simply connected but the fail-
ure of any single element partitions the network and
2the performance is weak. Real life networks lie in be-
tween these two examples, with varying degree distribu-
tions and more complex connectivity patterns. When
geographical constraints exist, which is the case for any
infrastructure network, adding certain links can be costly
or even impossible.
In an attempt to quantify vulnerability in this study,
path measures are used to rank the links in terms of their
significance in decreasing order, and then the failure of
these links are considered. Networks of equal sizes and
average degrees but with different degree distributions
are tested, and a formal vulnerability measure is devised
based on some measured parameters. This vulnerability
measure is then used along with other local and global
parameters in comparing different network types. Our
findings suggest that Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks are efficient,
and less vulnerable but lack a local structure pattern,
whereas scale free networks behave differently for varying
damage specifications.
II. FAILURE SIMULATIONS
A. Centrality Measures
An important question to address when considering
link failures is how to rank the links in terms of their
criticality. One extreme would be to run the simulations
for randomly failing links. A more systematic approach
would be to rank the links according to some criteria.
Over the years, network researchers introduced a num-
ber of measures for ranking the elements of a network ac-
cording to their position and role in the topology. Such
measures are generally termed as centrality indices[10–
12]. One of these indices, the shortest path betweenness
centrality, is defined to be the fraction of shortest paths
between pairs of nodes in a network that pass through
an element. If there is more than one shortest path be-
tween a given pair of nodes, then each such path is given
equal weight with the sum of the weights equal to one.
Shortest path betweenness can be thought of as a simu-
lation in which a network with n nodes is considered and
there are n − 1 agents at each node, each with the goal
of reaching each one of the remaining n− 1 nodes using
the shortest route possible. The elements that have been
visited the most have the highest values.[13, 14]
Since this measure takes only the shortest paths into
account, it may lead to strong biases in certain situa-
tions. Consider a network in which two clusters are con-
nected only by two paths, one shorter than the other.
All the shortest paths between nodes of the two differ-
ent clusters will pass through the shorter of these paths,
and the longer path will therefore have a shortest path
betweenness value of zero. This longer path, however, is
obviously not as insignificant for the network as this mea-
sure suggests, since once these two paths fail the network
would be divided into two distinct clusters that are not
connected. As an alternative, random walks can be con-
sidered instead of shortest paths. A simple random walk
suggests that a walker located at a specific node chooses
to move along on any one of the incident links with equal
probability, and continues moving until it finds itself at
the target. Walks with varying properties can be gen-
erated by manipulating the transition probabilities[15].
The random walk betweenness of a link is then defined
as the number of times a random walk between node
pairs passes through that link, averaged over all node
pairs [16, 17].
Another measure of the importance of a link to a net-
work is the so called average degree of a link, which is be
calculated as the average degree of the two nodes at the
two ends of a link. Although this measure is very blunt at
distinguishing links connecting low-degree nodes to high-
degree nodes from those links that connect two relatively
average degree nodes, it can still be considered useful be-
cause it is a very simple mechanism and far more easy to
calculate than the betweenness methods.
B. Network Simulations
Four types of networks with a fixed size (number of
nodes n = 256) and average degree (average number
of links per node k¯ = 8) are investigated via simula-
tions: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, scale free networks, small
world networks, and ring substrates. The former two
are created by first drawing a degree sequence from the
characteristic degree distribution: poisson distribution
for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and power law distribution for the scale
free networks [18] (Obtaining this sequence is known to
be an issue for scale free networks[19]). The process is
completed by randomly connecting nodes until the pre-
scribed degree sequence is reached [20, 21]. Small world
networks are produced using the Watts–Strogatz model,
with a rewiring probability that corresponds to a high
clustering coefficient and low shortest path length for this
specific network size and average degree[22–24]. Once a
network is formed, its links are ranked according to short-
est path betweenness, random walk betweenness, average
degree, and randomly. The highest ranked link is then
broken to start the simulation of a series of failures, and
this process is repeated until all links have failed.
The network reconfigures as failures occur: The de-
gree distribution, the paths, the betweenness values all
change, and therefore the link ranking also changes,
sometimes drastically. Therefore recalculating the link
ranking after every failure is very crucial in the sense
of what the simulation physically represents. As an ex-
ample, consider a highway network for which failure of a
path is said to occur if the average speed on it falls below
a certain limit. Once this path fails, drivers may choose
move to an alternative path until this new one becomes
jammed too - and so the process evolves. Although com-
putationally cumbersome, the recalculation procedure is
significant in order to properly represent the effects of
failures.
3Depending on the chosen ranking method, the failure
ratio and the type of the network, the response in the
network parameters vary. In particular, five different pa-
rameters are monitored after each link failure:
1. Ratio of Failed Links: The simulations move for-
ward along a generated network by failing links one
at a time until the network becomes empty. There-
fore the independent variable in these simulations
is the number of failed links. For easier tractabil-
ity, this number is divided by the initial number
of links in the network to obtain the ratio of failed
links.
2. Fragmentation Ratio: A simply connected network
consists of nodes where any node can reach any
other. When disconnections occur and the net-
work partitions into components, the probability
of reaching a target node in one component be-
comes zero for the nodes in another component.
Therefore the number of disconnected components
becomes a reflective measure of how damaged or
non-functional the network has become. This num-
ber is normalized by the total number of nodes to
be fixed in the unit interval and called the frag-
mentation ratio. This parameter has been used in
community detection problems as well [25]. The
sizes of the components is also pertinent, and this
issue has been been thoroughly investigated [26].
3. Ratio of Disconnected Node Pairs: The disconnec-
tion of a network of n = 100 into two components of
1 and 99 nodes or two components of 50 nodes each
should not be considered identical failures only be-
cause the number of disconnected components are
equal. Counting the number of node pairs that are
disconnected provides a simple way to quantify this
measure. This number can be normalized by the to-
tal number of node pairs to obtain the parameter
we call the ratio of disconnected node pairs. Let ni
denote the number of nodes in component i. Then,
ratio of
disconnected
node pairs
=
∑
i6=j ninj
n (n− 1) /2
(1)
4. Clustering Coefficient: The ratio of the number of
links between the neighbors of a node to the num-
ber of links between these neighbors if they were
to form a complete graph between them is called
the clustering coefficient [27]. It is a measure of
how locally redundant a network is, since a node
with a high clustering coefficient has a high num-
ber of links connecting its neighbors, and the num-
ber of alternating paths emanating from that node
are also plenty. Therefore this measure can also
be interpreted as an indicator of the abundance of
alternative paths in the network.
5. Efficiency: The sum of the inverses of the lengths
of the shortest paths between node pairs is the effi-
ciency of a network, a parameter in the unit in-
terval representing how short the shortest paths
are[28]. In mathematical form,
efficiency =
∑
i>j
1
lij
(2)
where lij denotes the length of the shortest path
between nodes i and j.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
The connectivity patterns of different network types
are observed to effect the simulation results, so we start
this section by a brief review of the network types consid-
ered. Ring substrates are ordered networks with a degree
distribution having zero variance. At the other extreme,
scale free networks have betweenness distributions that
obey the power law. The average nearest neighbor de-
gree of scale free networks generally decrease as the node
degree increases, but the average nearest neighbor clus-
tering coefficient increases, as in Figure 4 [29]. This ob-
servation is not a contradiction and it in fact highlights
the main connectivity pattern in a scale free network: few
hubs with low clustering coefficient values are connected
to many low-degree nodes that have higher clustering co-
efficients. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks lie somewhere between
these two extremes, however their totally random cre-
ation process inhibits clustering, unlike the scale free net-
works where there are certain zones with high clustering.
Small world networks, formed by the random rewiring of
a few links of a ring substrate, are known to bear the rel-
atively high clustering of ring substrates, as well as the
small shortest lengths of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks. In this
sense small world networks are an optimized version of
ring substrates [30–35].
The response of ring substrates to failures is shown in
Figure 1. The links that connect points which are farther
apart have higher betweenness values in these networks
since they act as shortcuts. When these long-range links
fail, the extra stress in the weakened zone is shared by
the nearby elements. In other words, the paths cross-
ing that portion of the ring now have fewer alternatives,
and therefore the links that carry this extra traffic end
up having higher betweenness values. This damaged por-
tion becomes the next failure zone until the connection is
no longer there, and the ring becomes an arc. The frag-
mentation is almost linear for this failure scheme, but
the real damage can be seen in the ratio of disconnected
node pairs: before 20 percent of links fail, almost 95 per-
cent of node pairs are already disconnected. The random
and average degree failures are not extremely harmful in
comparison, but networks undergo a change reminding a
phase transition around when 60 to 80 percent of links
have failed for these schemes.
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FIG. 1: The response of ring substrates of n = 256 and k¯ = 8, as the ratio of failed links is increased. Failure of the
links with high betweenness values quickly disconnects the network into large components, each with relatively
larger clustering coefficients. This process actually increases the clustering coefficient of the ring network, because
the links with high betweenness values are also those that lie in regions of nodes with lower clustering coefficients, as
can be seen in the third graph. The rapid increase in the ratio of disconnected node pairs happens simultaneously
with the increase in the average clustering coefficient. ( X : random walk betweenness, ∆ : shortest path
betweenness, O : average degree , + : random)
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FIG. 2: The response of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks of n = 256 and k¯ = 8, as the ratio of failed links is increased. In
terms of fragmentation, ranking methods fail to differ by a good margin. The fragmentation is almost bilinear with
a slower initial trend. Node-pair disconnection speed is very slow when compared to ring substrates. The increase in
the clustering coefficient is again apparent for betweenness schemes. ( X : random walk betweenness, ∆ : shortest
path betweenness, O : average degree , + : random)
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FIG. 3: The response of small world networks of n = 256 and k¯ = 8 with rewiring probability β = 0.035 [22], as the
ratio of failed links is increased. The results are almost identical to that of the ring substrate. ( X : random walk
betweenness, ∆ : shortest path betweenness, O : average degree , + : random)
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FIG. 4: The average nearest neighbor clustering
coefficient as a function of the node degree for a typical
scale free network with of n = 256 and k¯ = 8. The few
high degree nodes have higher clustering coefficients
compared to the low degree nodes.
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FIG. 5: A small graph illustrating the bad neighbor
concept. In this configuration, all nodes have clustering
coefficients equal to 1 except for A and B which have
values equal to 1/3. Correspondingly, the link
connecting A and B has the highest betweenness value.
The failure of this link increases the clustering
coefficients of these two nodes to 1 and keeps the others
unchanged while at the same time disconnecting the
network. Thus the clustering coefficient of the network
increases, along with the fragmentation ratio and the
ratio of disconnected node pairs. Nodes A and B are
bad neighbors of each other.
The increase in the clustering coefficient observed for
high betweenness failures in Figures 1 to Figure 3 may
seem surprising in two aspects. The curves all peak
around a ratio of failed links of 0.5, but this is only a re-
sult of the chosen network size and average degree. The
more important point is that the clustering coefficient
is increasing, which is counterintuitive but can simply be
explained by the definition of this parameter. If the num-
ber of neighbors of a node decreases, there is a chance of
an increase in the clustering coefficient of that node. The
process is depicted in Figure 5. The failure of the link be-
tween these nodes disconnects the network, but increases
the clustering coefficient of these networks to unity. In
this case node A is said to be a bad neighbor of node
B, and vice versa. One other process that indirectly con-
tributes to the increase of the clustering coefficient is that
a node with zero degree is no different than a node with
degree one in terms of its clustering coefficient, hence
the disconnection of this node leaves the average clus-
tering coefficient of the network unchanged. Considering
these processes in the larger scale, it may be concluded
that the high betweenness valued links must somehow be
those links that contribute negatively to the clustering
coefficient, i.e. the bad neighbors.
This result shows that betweenness and clustering coef-
ficient are somehow related. A low clustering coefficient
signals the lack of alternative paths, and in such cases
some incident links become the only available route for
a node to connect with other regions. As a consequence,
these links lying in zones with low clustering coefficients
have high betweenness values and generally contribute to
the bad neighbor effect: They inhibit clustering but are
also good transmitters. Therefore it is reasonable to ex-
pect an increase in the overall clustering coefficient when
these links fail.
In Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, the increase in the clustering
coefficient for the failure of links with high betweenness
values is smaller. The parameter peaks at the points
where about 60 to 90 percent of all links have failed,
which corresponds to a ratio of disconnected pairs very
close to 1. At this point the network consists of tiny
connected subgraphs that have the smallest number of
bad neighbors possible, which causes the slight increase
in the clustering coefficient. It should be noted that this
increase can also be caused by the very low clustering
values at the initial formation.
Figure 3 shows that small world networks, differing
only by a small percentage of link connections from ring
substrates, fail to respond very differently than their an-
cestors. Comparing these two networks in the smaller
failure zones (for example only up to the rewiring prob-
ability) rather than in the whole unit interval might be
more appropriate. However the parameters used to mea-
sure the network response are not sensitive enough for
small failures, thus making this comparison is not re-
warding.
Scale free networks seem to be most prone to frag-
mentation, as can be observed in Figure 6. Interestingly,
they do not demonstrate the increase in the clustering
coefficient like other networks. On the contrary, random
and average degree schemes exhibit a very fast initial de-
crease. This different behaviour exhibited by scale free
networks is caused by the exceptional betweenness distri-
bution of these networks: Few critical links have excep-
tionally high betweenness values, and many have low be-
tweenness values. As those few critical links fail (the 0 to
10 percent of failed links zone), the clustering coefficient
seems to be non-decreasing for betweenness schemes. At
the end of these failures, both the fragmentation ratio
and the ratio of disconnected node pairs are very high,
which suggests that the network then consists of several
disconnected components with similar sizes (note how
low variance of component sizes result in higher ratio of
disconnected node pairs). The variance of the between-
ness distribution quickly decreases such that the remain-
ing formation does not allow any link to stand out as a
high betweenness element. Failure of links with high be-
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FIG. 6: The response of scale free networks of n = 256 and k¯ = 8, as the ratio of failed links is increased. The
fragmentation is almost bilinear, but with a very steep initial trend, and node pair disconnections quickly saturate.
There is no increase in the clustering coefficient. ( X : random walk betweenness, ∆ : shortest path betweenness, O :
average degree , + : random)
tweenness values increase the clustering coefficient; con-
versely, failure of low betweenness valued links tend to
decrease the clustering coefficient. So once a scale free
network has lost its few high betweenness links, the bad
neighbor effect is no longer pertinent.
It can be observed in all cases that betweenness meth-
ods are far more effective in breaking down a network
when compared to the average degree and random fail-
ure schemes. The random walk betweenness is generally
more dangerous than the shortest path betweenness, as
observed in Figures 1 to 6. However the time required
to compute the random walk betweenness repeatedly for
large networks can be inhibiting, and the shortest path
betweenness may provide a very practical estimate of
random walk betweenness that is far more easy to cal-
culate. Another observation for all network types is that
the average degree failure scheme appears to be less de-
structive than random failures. This is actually to be
expected since this scheme especially protects the low
degree nodes. High average degree links are those that
connect high degree nodes; these nodes have many other
alternative paths, and even if a few of their incident links
fail, the remaining ones may suffice to maintain perfor-
mance. It therefore stands to reason that the probability
of disconnection in the average degree scheme should be
smaller than that for random failures.
Since efficiency is strongly correlated with the ratio of
disconnected node pairs, the responses of the networks to
failures in terms of efficiency seem generally in line with
what one might anticipate. Figure 7 reveals the efficiency
response, normalized by the efficiency value of each net-
work at its initial state. Scale free networks undergo a
rapid efficiency decrease for average degree and random
failure schemes, unlike other network types. For between-
ness failures, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks respond strongly, the
decrease behaves linearly unlike the exponential decrease
in the other network types.
IV. VULNERABILITY
The general formalism for the reliability or the vul-
nerability of networks have so far been associated with
primal cut sets[36–38]. In this section, we discuss the use
of a different approach to quantify what may be termed
to be the vulnerability of a network.
The results of the simulations indicate that between-
ness methods are very efficient in determining the criti-
cal links in a network, and that their failures cause quick
fragmentation. Therefore considering this response of a
network against the failure of its most central links in or-
der to formalize a vulnerability measure would be reason-
able. It has been stated that shortest path betweenness
is a good estimate for modeling the most detrimental link
failures. Therefore here we choose to apply the shortest
path betweenness as the failure regime in our calculations
of vulnerability. In this context, we define the vulnera-
bility of a network as a measure of the average speed by
which the decomposition of the network causes a spec-
ified ratio of node pairs to become disconnected. One
must subjectively decide on this ratio of disconnected
node pairs above which the network is accepted to be
performing inadequately. If this ratio, which we will call
the saturation level, is L, then the vulnerability corre-
sponding to this saturation level is defined as:
vulnerability =
L
ratio of failed links at L
. (3)
This definiton of vulnerability can also be interpreted
as the average percent of node pairs that are disconnected
per unit percentage link failures below the given satura-
tion level, as shown in Figure 8.
Networks respond differently to varying levels of link
failures, therefore it may be more informative to calcu-
late the vulnerability of a network for a range of link fail-
ure ratios. The differences resulting from the subjective
evaluation of a saturation level can also yield beneficial
information. Here we use three saturation levels of 10, 50
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FIG. 7: The efficiency response for ring substrates (upper left), Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (upper right), small world (lower left)
and scale free networks (lower right) of n = 256 and k¯ = 8, respectively. ( X : random walk betweenness, ∆ :
shortest path betweenness, O : average degree , + : random)
ratio of failed
links
ratio of
disconnected
node pairs
L
1
1
FIG. 8: A graph revealing the calculation of the
vulnerability measure. The black curve depicts the
change in the ratio of disconnected node pairs as the
ratio of failed links increase, for the shortest path
betweenness failure scheme. The red line is the linear
approximation of this arbitrary curve, drawn from the
origin to the black curve at the saturation level L. The
slope of this red line, or the highlighted angle, is the
vulnerability of the network.
and 90 percent node pair disconnections. These satura-
tion levels represent the possible states of a network after
failures occur. If the subject at hand is a highway net-
work in which bridges are prone to collapse in case of an
earthquake, the expected damage is low and short-term,
which suggests choosing a lower saturation level. On the
other hand if a failure is accepted to be congestion on
a highway, then large, long-term, cascading failures are
expected. Thus choosing a high saturation level is more
appropriate. Figure 9 shows three disconnection cases
that correspond to the saturation levels.
It is important to note the dependency of the vulner-
ability value on the selected saturation level, for slight
changes in saturation levels result in different vulnerabil-
ity values. Hence in order to properly decide on a satura-
tion level, one must carefully consider the true function
of the network and the failure scenarios for which the
network is being tested against.
When comparing networks in these terms and bear-
ing in mind the results obtained, it intuitively seems
that improving network efficiency without increasing the
average degree can only be achieved by removing short
range links at the local level and adding long range links
connecting formerly distant communities. However this
would also cause increased vulnerability since redundan-
cies would be removed. To utilize this information for
selecting a proper network type, the initial clustering co-
efficient and efficiency of the network must be taken into
account. One might consider vulnerability as a measure
8n1 = 244
n2 = 12
n1 = 128 n2 = 128 n1...8 = 32
FIG. 9: Three disconnection cases for networks with n = 256 that approximately correspond to the three saturation
levels used in this study, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively. The disconnection of a relatively small group of nodes from
the giant component depicts a saturation level of 0.1, whereas more than several components with equal sizes
indicate a level of 0.9.
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FIG. 10: Vulnerability versus initial efficiency for the four network types and saturation levels of 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9.
Smaller markers depict results of a single network realization, and the bigger markers represent the mean points of
such realizations. For lower saturation levels scale free networks are more vulnerable but also more efficient. Ring
substrates, small world networks and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks differ only slightly in terms of their vulnerabilities. For
increased saturation levels of 0.5 and 0.9, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks seem to be the least vulnerable and the second most
efficient. Ring substrates are both vulnerable and inefficient for these levels. ( X : small world networks, ∆ : ring
substrates, O : scale free networks, + : Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks )
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FIG. 11: Vulnerability versus initial clustering coefficient for the four network types and saturation levels of 0.1, 0.5
and 0.9. Smaller markers depict results of a single network realization, and the bigger markers represent the mean
points of such realizations. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks have very small clustering coefficients but low vulnerability as
well. When compared to small world networks and ring substrates, scale free networks are less vulnerable for smaller
saturation levels, but become more vulnerable with increasing saturation level. ( X : small world networks, ∆ : ring
substrates, O : scale free networks, + : Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks )
that can be used to relate the efficiency and the clustering
coefficient of a network, or simply a third dimension on
which different network types can be further compared.
It can be seen from Figure 10 that scale free networks
are more efficient when compared to others, but always
very vulnerable for small saturation levels. For higher
saturation levels, however, scale free networks are not as
vulnerable as rings or small worlds. It should be noted
9that Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks seem to be efficient above av-
erage and resistant to various saturation levels, therefore
should be the best choice if the prime concern is to have
a network that is both resistant to failures and efficient.
Figure 11 shows, on the other hand, that if a clus-
tered network is preferred, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks are the
worst choice despite their low vulnerability values. Per-
formances of the other network types are very similar in
terms of clustering, but they differ in terms of vulnera-
bility for different saturation levels. For the 0.1 and 0.5
levels, scale free networks are more vulnerable then the
others. For the 0.9 level, however, scale free networks
are less vulnerable and less clustered when compared to
small world networks and ring substrates.
V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to discuss how some of the
well-known network types perform when they suffer link
failures. To this end, various methods of ranking were
used to decide on the importance of the links in the net-
works, and failures were carried out by removing the links
starting with the highest rated one. Based on the result
of the simulations, a very simple vulnerability index was
defined and it was observed that this index is capable of
differentiating the performance of the networks for dif-
ferent saturation levels.
The results obtained show that in terms of long term
vulnerability, ring structures are the most vulnerable
amongst the network types investigated herein, followed
by small worlds. On the other hand, for relatively higher
average degrees, small worlds appear to be closer to
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks in terms of vulner-
ability; they are redundant on the local level despite be-
ing less efficient. In terms of short term vulnerability,
however, the difference between small worlds and more
random networks disappear; moreover, small worlds be-
come less vulnerable at smaller saturation levels. Thus if
the subject network is prone to failures of bigger magni-
tudes and if conditions permit, a power-law distribution
would be a wiser choice for an infrastructure network in
terms of local redundancies, vulnerability and efficiency.
If, however, there is only a negligible probability of mass
failures, then the vulnerability of small worlds and ran-
dom networks are more or less the same; in such cases the
function of the network would determine whether higher
clustering is to be preferred over higher efficiency or vice
versa.
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